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Abstract. Recently, Mun et al. analyzed Wu et al.’s authentication scheme and proposed a
enhanced anonymous authentication scheme for roaming service in global mobility networks.
However, through careful analysis, we find that Mun et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to imperson-
ation attacks, off-line password guessing attacks and insider attacks, and cannot provide user
friendliness, user’s anonymity, proper mutual authentication and local verification. To remedy
these weaknesses, in this paper we propose a novel anonymous authentication scheme for roam-
ing service in global mobility networks. Security and performance analyses show the proposed
scheme is more suitable for the low-power and resource-limited mobile devices, and is secure
against various attacks and has many excellent features.
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§1 Introduction
GLOBAL mobility network (GLOMONET) [1] provides global roaming service that permits
mobile user to use the services provided by his/her home agent (HA) in a foreign agent (FA).
When a mobile user roams into a foreign network, mutual authentication must first be solved
to prevent illegal use from accessing services and to ensure that mobile users are connected
to a trusted networks. A strong user authentication scheme in GLOMONET should satisfy
the following requirements: (1) user anonymity; (2) low communication cost and computation
complexity; (3) single registration; (4) update session key periodically; (5) user friendly; (6) no
password/verifier table; (7) update password securely and freely; (8) prevention of fraud; (9)
prevention of replay attack; (10) security; and (11) providing the authentication scheme when a
user is located in the home network. More details about these requirements can be found in [2].
In order to achieve secure and effective mutual authentication and privacy protection in
GLOM-ONET, many authentication protocols have been proposed [2-17]. In 2004, Zhu and
E-mail address: dwzhao@ymail.com (Dawei Zhao); penghaipeng@bupt.edu.cn (Haipeng Peng).
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2Ma [3] proposed an authentication scheme with anonymity for wireless environments. However,
Lee et al. [4] pointed out that Zhu et al.’s scheme [3] cannot achieve mutual authentication
and perfect backward secrecy, and is vulnerable to the forgery attack. At the same time, Lee
et al. proposed an enhanced anonymous authentication scheme, but Chang et al. [5] and Wu
et al. [6] found that Lee et al.’s scheme also cannot achieve user’anonymity, and an attacker
who has registered as a user of an HA can obtain the identity of other users as long as they
registered at the same HA. After that, in 2011, Li et al. [2] found Wu et al. [6] is unlikely to
provide user’s anonymity due to an inherent design weakness and also vulnerable to replay and
impersonation attacks. Then they constructed a strong user authentication scheme with smart
cards for wireless communications. However, Li and Lee [7] showed that Li et al.’s scheme [2]
lacks of user friendliness, and cannot provide user’s anonymity and unfairness in key agreement.
Recently, Mun et al. [8] reanalyzed Wu et al.’ authentication scheme [6], they point out
that Wu et al.’s scheme also fails to achieve user’s anonymity and perfect forward secrecy, and
discloses of legitimate user’s password. Then they proposed an enhanced anonymous authentica-
tion scheme for roaming service in global mobility networks. However, through careful analysis,
we find that Mun et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to impersonation attacks, off-line password guess-
ing attacks and insider attacks, and cannot provide user friendliness, user’s anonymity, proper
mutual authentication and local verification. To remedy these weaknesses, in this paper we
propose a novel anonymous authentication scheme for roaming service in global mobility net-
works. Security and performance analyses show the proposed scheme is more suitable for the
low-power and resource-limited mobile devices, and is secure against various attacks and has
many excellent features.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides some basic knowledge.
In Section 3, we review Mun et al.’s scheme and Section 4 shows the security weaknesses of
Mun et al.’s scheme. A novel user authentication scheme is proposed in Section 5. In Section
6, we analyze the security of our proposed scheme. Next, we compare the functionality and
performance of our proposed scheme and make comparisons with other related schemes in Section
7. Finally, in Section 8 we make some conclusions.
§2 Preliminaries
In this section, we briefly introduce the elliptic curve cryptosystem and some related mathemat-
ical assumptions. Compared with other public key cryptography, elliptic curve cryptosystem
(ECC) has significant advantages like smaller key sizes, faster computation. It has been widely
used in several cryptographic schemes of wireless network environment to provide desired level
of security and computational efficiency.
2.1 Elliptic curve cryptosystem
Let Ep(a, b) be a set of elliptic curve points over the prime field Ep, defined by the non-singular
elliptic curve equation: y2mod p = (x3+ ax+ b)modp with a, b ∈ Fp and (4a
3+27b2)modp 6= 0.
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Table 1: Notations used in Mun et al.’s scheme.
Notation Description
MU , FA, HA Mobile User, Foreign Agent, Home Agent
PWX Password of an entity X
IDX Identity of an entity X
h(·) A one-way hash function
NX Number used only once (Random number) generated by an entity X
‖ Concatenation operation
⊕ XOR operation
fK MAC generation function by using the key K
KXY Session key between entity X and Y
The additive elliptic curve group defined as Gp = {(x, y) : x, y ∈ Fp and (x, y) ∈ Ep(a, b)} ∪O,
where the point O is known as “point at infinity”. The scalar multiplication on the cyclic group
Gp defined as k · P = P + P + · · ·+ P
︸ ︷︷ ︸
k times
. A point P has order n if n · P = O for smallest integer
n > 0. More details about elliptic curve group properties can be found in [18-20].
2.2 Related mathematical assumptions
To prove the security of our proposed protocol, we present some important computational prob-
lems over the elliptic curve group which are frequently used to design secure cryptographic
schemes.
(1) Computational discrete logarithm (CDL) problem: Given R = x · P , where P,R ∈ Gp.
It is easy to calculate R given x and P , but it is hard to determine x given P and R.
(2) Computational Diffie-Hellman (CDH) problem: Given P, xP, yP ∈ Gp, it is hard to
compute xyP ∈ Gp.
(3) Elliptic curve factorization (ECF) problem: Given two points P and R = x · P + y · P
for x, y ∈ Z∗q , it is hard to find x · P and y · P .
§3 Review of Mun et al.’s scheme
In this section, we briefly review the Mun et al.’s scheme [8]. There are three phases in their
scheme: registration phase, authentication and establishment of session key phase, and update
session key phase. Three entities are involved: MU is a mobile user, FA is the agent of the
foreign network, and HA is the home agent of the mobile user MU . Table 1 lists some notations
used in Mun et al.s scheme.
43.1 Registration phase
When a mobile user MU wants to become a legal client to access the services, MU needs to
register himself/herself to his/her home agent HA. The handshake between MU and HA is
depicted in Fig. 1.
MU (Mobile user) HA (Home Agent)
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Figure 1: Registration phase of Mun et al.’s scheme.
Step R1: MU sends his/her identity IDMU and a random number NMU to HA.
Step R2: HA generates a random number NHA and computes PWMU = h(NMU‖NHA)
and rMU = h(IDMU‖PWMU )⊕ IDHA.
Step R3: HA sends rMU , PWMU , NHA, IDHA, and h(·) to MU through a secure channel.
3.2 Authentication and establishment of session key phase
When a mobile user MU roams into a foreign network FA and wants to access services provided
by FA. The FA needs to verify the validity of MU with the assistance of HA, and proves to
MU that he is a legitimate service provider. The authentication and establishment of session
key phase of Mun et al.’s scheme is shown in Fig.2.
Step A1: MU submits IDHA, NHA and rMU to FA.
Step A2: FA stores the received message from MU for further communications and gener-
ates a random number NFA. Then, FA sends IDFA, NFA and rMU to HA.
Step A3: After receiving the message sent from FA, HA computes r′MU = h(IDMU‖PWMU )
⊕IDHA and compares it with the received rMU . If they are not equal, HA considers MU as
illegal user and terminates this procedure. Otherwise, HA can authenticate MU . Next, HA
computes PHA = h(PWMU‖NFA) and SHA = h(IDFA‖NFA)⊕ rMU ⊕ PHA. Then, HA sends
the computed SHA and PHA to FA.
Step A4: When receiving SHA and PHA sent fromHA, FA computes S
′
HA = h(IDFA‖NFA)
⊕rMU ⊕PHA and . Then, FA verifies whether S
′
HA equals the received SHA. If the result is not
correct, the procedure is terminated. Next, FA computes SFA = h(SHA‖NFA‖NHA), selects
Dawei Zhao, et al. 5
MU (Mobile user) FA (Foreign Agent) HA (Home Agent)
{ ,  ,  }HA HA MUID N r
Generate  FAN
{ ,  ,  }FA FA MUID N r
 with 
(Authenticate )
Compare ( )
Compute ( )
Compute ( )
MU MU MU MU HA
HA MU FA
HA FA FA MU HA
r r h ID PW ID
P h PW N
S
MU
h ID N r P
′ = ⊕
=
= ⊕ ⊕
‖
‖
‖
{ ,  }HA HAS P
Verify 
Compute ( )
Compare  with 
(Compute || || ) a nd 
HA FA FA MU
HA H
HA
HA
FA HA FA
A
HA
S
S
P
S h S N N aP
h ID N r
S S
′ = ⊕ ⊕
′
=
‖
Verify 
Compute ( ) ( )
Comp
 (Authenticate  and )
 with ' ( ' ||  are 
Co
||  )
( )mput ,  ( |e , | ) 
MF
FA
FA FA HA FA HA
MF MF K
HA FA FA MU MU
FA
FA
S HA FA
S S h S N N
K h abP
S h ID N r
S f N bP
h PW N
bP
′ =
=
⊕
=
⊕
=
‖ ‖
{ ,  ,  ( || || )}FA FA HA FA FAS aP P S ID N=
{ , }MFbP S
( ),  
Verif
Co
y  (Authen
mp
t
ute 
icate )
MF
MF
K h abP
S MU
=
Figure 2: Authentication and establishment of session key phase of Mun et al.’s scheme.
random number a, and computes aP on E by using Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) [].
After that, FA sends SFA, aP and PFA = (SHA‖IDFA‖NFA) to MU .
Step A5: First, MU computes S′HA = h(IDFA‖NFA) ⊕ rMU ⊕ h(PWMU‖NFA) and
S′FA = h(S
′
HA‖NFA‖NHA). Then, MU checks whether S
′
FA = SFA. If they are not equal,
the procedure is terminated. Otherwise, MU can authenticate FA and HA. Afterwards, MU
selects a random number b, and computes bP and a session key KMF = h(abP ). Moreover, MU
computes SMF = fKMF (NFA‖bP ), and sends bP and SMF to FA.
Step A6: After receiving the message sent from MU , FA computes KMF = h(abP ) and
S′MF = fKMF (NFA‖bP ). FA verifies whether S
′
MF equals the received SMF . If the result is not
correct, session key KMF = h(abP ) between MU and FA is not valid and FA terminates the
procedure. Otherwise, FA can authenticate MU .
63.3 Update session key phase
MU and FA need to renew session key for security reasons if user is always within a same FA.
When MU visits FA at the ith session, the following process is conducted to authenticate FA:
Step U1: MU selects a new random number bi, computes biP (i = 1, 2, ..., n), and sends
biP to FA.
Step U2: FA selects a new random number ai and computes aiP (i = 1, 2, ..., n). Then FA
generates a new session keyKMFi = h(aibiP ), and then computes SMFi = fKMFi (aibiP‖ai−1bi−1P ).
After that, FA sends aiP and SMFi to MU .
Step U3: MU computes session key KMFi = h(aibiP ) by using the received aiP . MU
computes S′MFi = fKMFi (aibiP‖ai−1bi−1P ). Then, MU checks whether S
′
MFi
= SMFi . If they
are equal, the new session key KMFi = h(aibiP ) is established between MU and FA.
Procedure of update session key phase is depicted in Fig.3.
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Figure 3: Update session key phase of Mun et al.’s scheme.
§4 Weaknesses of Mun et al.’s scheme
Recently, Kim and Kwak [21] pointed out that Mun et al.’s scheme [8] cannot withstand replay
attacks and man-in-the-middle attacks. Through careful analysis, in this section we show that
Mun et al.’s scheme is also vulnerable to impersonation attacks, off-line password guessing at-
tacks and insider attacks, and cannot provide user friendliness, user’s anonymity, proper mutual
authentication and local verification.
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4.1 Impersonation attacks
4.1.1 MU impersonation attacks
In Mun et al.’s scheme, an attacker can masquerade as a user MU to cheating any foreign agent
FA′ and MU ’s HA if he/she has intercepted a valid login request message {IDHA, NHA, rMU}
of MU . First, the attacker generates a random number N ′HA and sends {IDHA, N
′
HA, rMU}
to FA′. Since IDHA and rMU are the real home agent and correct personal information of
MU respectively, the login request message can pass the validation of HA. Furthermore, HA
will notify the FA′ that the attacker who is masquerading as the user MU is a legitimate user.
Therefore, the attacker can further establish a session key with FA′ and access the services
provided by FA′.
4.1.2 FA impersonation attacks
In the authentication and establishment of session key phase of Mun et al.’s scheme, it can be
found that the HA only authenticates the MU by verifying the received rMU but do not make
any authentication to the FA. At the same time, there is no secret information of FA in the
message {IDFA, NFA, rMU} sent from FA to MU ’s HA. Thus an attacker can masquerade as
a foreign agent FA to cheating any user MU ′ and MU ′’s HA. For example, if the attacker
intercepts a login request message {IDHA, NHA, rMU ′} sent from MU
′ to FA, the attacker can
generate a random number NFA and send {IDFA, NFA, rMU ′} to HA by masquerading as FA.
Since rMU ′ is the correct personal information of MU
′ and there is no identity authentication
process of HA to FA. Therefore, the message {IDHA, NHA, rMU ′} can pass the authentication
of HA. At the same time, since the authentication of MU ′ to FA is completely dependent
on HA and FA has been authenticated by HA, the FA will pass the authentication of MU ′.
Therefore, the attacker who is masquerading as the FA can establish a session key with MU ′
and tricks MU ′ successfully.
4.1.3 HA impersonation attacks
In the authentication and establishment of session key phase of Mun et al.’s scheme, the FA
authenticates MU and HA by verifying whether S′HA = SHA. However, there is a security
vulnerability in this step such that an attacker can masquerade as a home agent to help any
agent pass the authentication of a FA and access the services provided by FA. It is assumed
that B is a agent who wants to access the services provided by FA and A is an attacker who
masquerades as B’s home agent HA to help B pass the authentication of FA.
First, B freely chooses two numbers N ′ and r′, and submits {IDHA, N
′, r′} to FA. Then FA
generates a random number NFA and sends the message {IDFA, NFA, r
′} to HA. Right now, A
intercepts this message, freely chooses a number P ′, and computes SHA = h(IDFA‖NFA)⊕r
′⊕
P ′. Then, A sends the computed SHA and P
′ to FA. When receiving SHA and P
′ sent from A
who is masquerading as the HA, FA computes S′HA = h(IDFA‖NFA)⊕ r
′⊕P ′. Obviously, the
8S′HA equals the received SHA. Next, FA computes SFA = h(SHA‖NFA‖N
′), selects random
number a, and computes aP . After that, FA sends {SFA, aP, PFA = (SHA‖IDFA‖NFA)} to
B. At this point, B does not need to verify the SFA, but directly chooses a random number
b and computes KMF = h(abP ) and SMF = fKMF (NFA‖bP ). Then B sends bP and SMF
to FA. After receiving {bP, SMF } sent from B, FA computes KMF = h(abP ) and S
′
MF =
fKMF (NFA‖bP ). Obviously, this is S
′
MF = SMF . FA thus authenticates B. By the above
method, with the assistance of A, B establishes the session key KMF = h(abP ) with FA and
can access the services provided by FA.
4.2 Off-line password guessing attacks
Most passwords have such low entropy that it is vulnerable to password guessing attacks, where
an attacker intercepts useful information from the open channel or the lost smart card. In Mun
et al.’s scheme, an attacker is assumed to have intercepted a previous full transmitted mes-
sages {IDHA, NHA, rMU , IDFA, NFA,rMU , SHA, PHA, SFA, aP , PFA = (SHA‖IDFA‖NFA),
bP , SMF }. The attacker can submit the guessing password PW
′
MU and compute S
′
HA =
h(IDFA‖NFA) ⊕ rMU ⊕ h(PW
′
MU ‖ NFA). If the computed S
′
HA is equal to SHA, the at-
tacker can regard the guessing password PW ′MU as the original password PWMU . Therefore,
Mun et al.’s scheme cannot withstand the off-line password guessing attacks.
4.3 Insider attacks
In the registration phase,MU sends IDMU and a random numberNMU toHA. ThenHA gener-
ates a random numberNHA, computes PWMU = h(NMU‖NHA) and rMU = h(IDMU‖PWMU )⊕
IDHA, and sends {rMU , PWMU , NHA, IDHA, h(·)} to MU through a secure channel. It is ob-
vious that the HA knows all the secret information of MU so that HA can impersonate MU
to do anything. Therefore, Mun et al.’s scheme is vulnerable to the insider attack.
4.4 Lack of user friendliness
User friendliness means that the proposed authentication scheme should be easily used by users.
However, in the registration phase of Mun et al.’s scheme, the home agent HA sends the infor-
mation {rMU , PWMU , NHA, IDHA, h(·)} to the user MU without using smart card. So that
MU needs to remember and enter so much information in the authentication and establishment
of session key phase. Therefore, Mun et al.’s scheme is actually infeasible and unrealistic.
4.5 Lack of user’s anonymity
In the second phase of Mun et al.’s scheme, MU sends rMU to FA instead of his/her real identity
IDMU . Thus the authors claimed that their scheme achieves the user’s anonymity. However,
in each login message {IDHA, NHA, rMU} of MU , the contents of NHA and rMU are always
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unchanged. Any attacker could easily trace MU according to NHA and rMU and thus the user’s
anonymity cannot achieved.
4.6 Lack of proper mutual authentication
In Mun et al.’s scheme, the HA does not maintain any verification table. Thus after receiving
the message {IDFA, NFA, rMU} sent from FA, HA cannot recognize which user launched the
authentication request to FA. So HA cannot computes r′MU and checks it with the received
rMU . On the other hand, even if HA can compute r
′
MU and check whether r
′
MU = rMU , it
only means HA authenticates the legality of MU . However, it is found that HA do not make
any authentication to the FA. Therefore, Mun et al.’s scheme cannot provide proper mutual
authentication.
4.7 Lack of local verification
In the authentication and establishment of session key phase of Mun et al.’s scheme, the MU
directly enters and sends the login message to FA. Note that the smart terminal of MU does
not verify the entered information correctly or not. Therefore, even if the MU enters the
login message incorrectly by mistake or an attacker sends an forged message, the authentication
phase still continue in their scheme. This obviously results to cause unnecessarily having extra
communication and computational costs.
§5 The proposed scheme
In this section, we propose a novel anonymous authentication scheme for roaming service in
global mobility networks using elliptic curve cryptosystem to not only protect the scheme from
security breaches, but also emphasize the efficient features. In addition to including the general
registration phase, authentication and establishment of session key phase and update session
key phase, our scheme also contains the update password phase and authentication and estab-
lishment of session key scheme when a mobile user is located in his/her home network. Table 2
lists some notations used in Mun et al.s scheme.
5.1 Registration phase
When a mobile user MU wants to become a legal client to access the services, MU needs to
register himself/herself to his/her home agent HA.
Step R1: MU freely chooses his/her identity IDMU and password PWMU , and generates
a random number xMU . Then MU submits IDMU and h(PWMU‖xMU ) to HA for registration
via a secure channel.
Step R2: When receiving the message IDMU and h(PWMU‖xMU ), HA computes Q =
h(IDMU‖y) ⊕ h(PWMU‖xMU ) and H = h(IDMU‖h(PWMU‖xMU )). Then HA stores the
10
Table 2: Notations used in the proposed scheme.
Notation Description
MU , FA, HA Mobile User, Foreign Agent, Home Agent
PWX Password of an entity X
IDX Identity of an entity X
h(·) A one-way hash function
CertX Certificate of an entity X
PX Public key of X
SX Private key of X
EK [·]/DK [·] Symmetric encryption/decryption using key K
EK{·}/DK{·} Asymmetric encryption/decryption using key K
‖ Concatenation operation
⊕ XOR operation
message {Q,H,C, IDHA} in a smart card and submits the smart card to MU through a secure
channel.
Step R3: After receiving the smart card, MU enters xMU into the smart card. Finally,
MU ’s smart card contains parameters {Q,H,C, IDHA, xMU}.
The details of user registration phase are shown in Fig.4.
MU (Mobile user) HA (Home Agent)
{ , ( || )}
MUM MUU
h PW xID
( ( )).
Compute: 
( ) ( ),MU MU MU
MMU MU U
Q h ID y h PW x
IH h hD PW x=
= ⊕‖ ‖
‖ ‖
Smart card: { , , , }HAQ H C ID
Generate random num
Com
ber
put
 ,
( | .e | )
MU
MU MU
x
h PW x
Store smart card: { , , , , }.HA MUQ H C ID x
Figure 4: Registration phase of the proposed scheme.
5.2 Authentication and establishment of session key phase
When a mobile user MU roams into a foreign network FA and wants to access services provided
by FA. The FA needs to verify the validity of MU with the assistance of HA, and proves to
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MU that he is a legitimate service provider. The authentication and establishment of session
key phase of our proposed scheme is described as follows:
Step A1: MU inserts his/her smart card into the smart card reader, and inputs identity
IDMU and password PWMU . Then the smart card computes H
∗ = h(IDMU‖h(PWMU‖xMU )),
and checks whether H∗ = H . If they are equal, it means MU is a legitimate user. Otherwise
the smart card aborts the session. Next, the smart card generates a random numbers a, and
computes A = aP , RAC = aC, N = Q⊕h(PWMU‖xMU ), DIDMU = IDMU⊕h(RAC) and V1 =
h(N‖RAC‖IDHA). Then the smart card sends the request message {A,DIDMU , C, V1, IDHA}
to FA over a public channel.
Step A2: After receiving the message {A,DIDMU , C, V1, IDHA}, FA generates a random
numbers b, and computes B = bP , RBC = bC, W2 = ERBC [A,CertFA, V1, DIDMU ] and
V2 = ESFA{h(A, V1, DIDMU )}. Here, SFA is the private key of FA, and CertFA is FA’s
certificate. Then FA sends {B,W2, V2} to HA.
Step A3: When receiving {B,W2, V2},HA first computesRBC = cB and decryptsDRBC [W2]
to reveal A,CertFA, V1 and DIDMU . Then, HA verifies the certificate CertFA and the FA’s
public key PFA. If they are valid, HA verifies the FA’s signature V2 by using the FA’s
public key PFA. If they are valid, FA is authenticated. After that, HA computes RAC =
cA, IDMU = DIDMU ⊕ h(RAC) and V
∗
1
= h(h(IDMU‖y)‖RAC‖IDHA). Then HA checks
whether V ∗
1
= V1. If they are equal, MU is authenticated by HA. Next, HA computes
W1 = h(h(IDMU‖y)‖A‖B‖IDFA‖IDHA), W3 = ERBC [IDFA, CertHA, A,B,W1] and V3 =
ESHA{h(CertHA,W1)}. At last, HA sends {W3, V3} to FA.
Step A4: FA decrypts DRBC [W3] to reveal IDFA, CertHA, A,B and W1. Then, the FA
verifies the HA’s signature V3 by using the HA’s public key PHA. If it is valid, HA is authen-
ticated which also means that HA claimed MU is a legitimate user. After that, FA computes
the common session key SK = h(bA) and sends {B, IDFA,W1} to MU .
Step A5: After receiving the message {B, IDFA,W1}, MU computes W
∗
1
= h(N‖A‖B‖
IDFA‖IDHA) and checks whether W
∗
1
= W1. If they are equal, FA and HA are all authenti-
cated by MU . Then MU establishes the common session key SK = h(aB).
The authentication and establishment of session key phase is depicted in Fig.5.
5.3 Update session key phase
MU and FA need to renew session key for security reasons if user is always within a same FA.
When MU visits FA at the ith session, the following process is conducted to authenticate FA:
Step U1: MU selects a new random number ai, computes Ai = aiP (i = 1, 2, ..., n), and
sends Ai to FA.
Step U2: FA selects a new random number bi and computes Bi = biP (i = 1, 2, ..., n).
Then FA generates a new session key SKi = h(biAi), and then computes Si = h(biAi‖SKi−1).
After that, FA sends Bi and Si to MU .
Step U3: MU computes S′i = h(aiBi‖SKi−1) and checks whether S
′
i = Si. If they are not
equal, MU aborts the session. Otherwise, MU computes the new session key SKi = h(aiBi).
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Figure 5: Authentication and establishment of session key phase of the proposed scheme.
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The details of update session key phase of the proposed scheme are shown in Fig.6.
MU (Mobile user) FA (Foreign Agent)
{ }iA
-1
Select ,
Compute .
New session key  ( ).
Compute ( || ).
i
i i
i i i
i i i i
b
B b P
SK h b A
S h b A SK
=
=
=
-1Compute '  ( || )
Check ' ? .
New session key  ( ).
i i i i
i i
i i i
S h a B SK
S S
SK h a B
=
=
=
{ , }
i i
B S
Comput
Select
e 
 ,
.
i
i i
a
A a P=
Figure 6: Update session key phase of the proposed scheme.
5.4 Update password phase
This phase is invoked whenever MU wants to change his password PWMU to a new password
PWnewMU . There is no need for a secure channel for password change, and it can be finished
without communicating with his/her HA.
Step U1: MU inserts his/her smart card into the smart card reader, and inputs identity
IDMU and password PWMU . Then the smart card computes H
∗ = h(IDMU‖h(PWMU‖xMU )),
and checks whether H∗ = H . If they are not equal, the smart card rejects the password change
request. Otherwise, MU inputs a new password PWnewMU and a new random number x
new
MU .
Step U2: The smart card computes Qnew = Q ⊕ h(PWMU‖xMU ) ⊕ h(PW
new
MU ‖x
new
MU ) and
Hnew = h(IDMU ‖h(PW
new
MU ‖x
new
MU )). Then, the smart card replaces Q, H and xMU with Q
new,
Hnew and xnewMU to finish the password change phase.
5.5 Authentication and establishment of session key scheme when a
mobile user is located in his/her home network
Corresponding to the authentication and establishment of session key phase when a mobile user
is located in a foreign network, in this subsection we propose an authentication and establishment
of session key scheme for that when a mobile user is located in his/her home network. The detail
processes are described as follows and depicted in Fig.7.
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Figure 7: Authentication and establishment of session key scheme when a mobile user is located
in his/her home network.
Step A1: MU inserts his/her smart card into the smart card reader, and inputs identity
IDMU and password PWMU . Then the smart card computes H
∗ = h(IDMU‖h(PWMU‖xMU )),
and checks whether H∗ = H . If they are equal, it means MU is a legitimate user. Otherwise
the smart card aborts the session. Next, the smart card generates a random numbers a, and
computes A = aP , RAC = aC, N = Q⊕h(PWMU‖xMU ), DIDMU = IDMU⊕h(RAC) and V1 =
h(N‖RAC‖IDHA). Then the smart card sends the request message {A,DIDMU , C, V1, IDHA}
to HA over a public channel.
Step A2: After receiving the message {A,DIDMU , C, V1, IDHA},HA first computesRAC =
cA and IDMU = DIDMU ⊕ h(RAC) and V
∗
1
= h(h(IDMU‖y)‖RAC‖IDHA). Then HA checks
whether V ∗
1
= V1. If they are equal, MU is authenticated by HA. Next, HA generates a
random number u, and computes U = uP and W1 = h(h(IDMU‖y)‖A‖C‖U‖IDHA). At last,
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HA computes the session key SK = h(uA) and sends {U,W1, IDHA} to MU .
Step A3: When receiving the message {U,W1, IDHA}, MU computes W
∗
1
= h(N‖A‖C‖U‖
IDHA) and checks whether W
∗
1
= W1. If they are equal, HA is authenticated by MU . Then
MU establishes the common session key SK = h(aU).
§6 Security analysis of the proposed scheme
In this section, we show that the proposed scheme can withstand all possible security attacks
and can work correctly.
Proposition 1. The proposed scheme can provide user’s anonymity.
Proof. In our proposed scheme, the mobile user MU sends the login request message {A,
DIDMU , C, V1, IDHA} to FA, where DIDMU = IDMU ⊕ h(aC) is used to protect the real
identity IDMU of MU . Based on the CDL problem, any attacker cannot obtain the random
number a form A and thus cannot retrieve IDMU from DIDMU . At the same time, the attacker
cannot trace the moving history and current location of MU according to the login request
message since A, DIDMU and V1 are dynamically changed in different login request messages
of MU . Therefore, the proposed scheme can provide user’s anonymity.
Proposition 2. The proposed scheme can provide proper mutual authentication and thus
prevent impersonation attack.
Proof. In order to impersonation attack, the mobile user MU , the foreign agent FA, and
the home agent HA should authenticate each other, which requires that our protocol provides
mutual authentication mechanism between any two of them. The proposed scheme can efficiently
prevent impersonation attacks by considering the following scenarios:
(1) The proposed scheme provides authentication of FA and HA to MU , and thus attacker
cannot impersonate MU to cheat FA and HA. In the proposed scheme, whether MU is lo-
cated in a foreign network or in his/her home network, the HA authenticates MU by verifying
the computed V ∗
1
= h(h(IDMU‖y)‖RAC‖IDHA) with the received V1 = h(N‖RAC‖IDHA).
Since the attacker does not possess MU ’s password PWMU , he/she cannot compute the correct
N = Q ⊕ h(PWMU‖xMU ) and thus cannot cheat HA by forging a login request message. At
the same time, since a is a one-time random number and only possessed by MU , V1 is dynam-
ically changed in each login request message. Therefore, the attacker cannot cheat the HA by
replaying a previous login request message. Beside, when MU is located in a foreign network,
the authentication of FA to MU is completely dependent on the authentication of HA to MU .
If an attacker cannot successfully cheat HA by masquerading as MU , he/she cannot cheat FA
successfully.
(2) The proposed scheme provides authentication of HA and MU to FA, and thus attacker
cannot impersonate FA to cheat HA and MU . In the proposed scheme, the HA authenticates
FA by checking whetherDPFA{V2} equals h(A, V1, DIDMU ), where V2 is FA’s digital signature.
Obviously, the attacker cannot compute the correct FA’s digital signature without knowing
FA’s private key SFA. Therefore, the attacker cannot cheat HA successfully by masquerading
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as FA. At the same time, the authentication of MU to FA is completely dependent on the
authentication of HA to FA. If an attacker cannot successfully cheat HA by masquerading as
FA, he/she cannot cheat MU successfully.
(3) The proposed scheme provides authentication of FA and MU to HA, and thus at-
tacker cannot impersonate HA to cheat FA and MU . In the proposed scheme, the FA
authenticates HA by checking whether DPHA{V3} equals h(CertHA,W1), where V3 is HA’s
digital signature. Obviously, the attacker cannot compute the correct HA’s digital signature
without knowing HA’s private key SHA. Therefore, the attacker cannot cheat FA success-
fully by masquerading as HA. Besides, the MU authenticates HA by verifying the computed
W ∗
1
= h(N‖A‖B‖IDFA‖IDHA) with the received W1 = h(h(IDMU‖y)‖A‖B‖IDFA‖IDHA).
Since any attacker cannot compute the correct W1 without knowing IDMU and y, the attacker
cannot cheat MU successfully.
Proposition 3. The proposed scheme can withstand the replay attack.
Proof. An attacker might replay an old login request message {A,DIDMU , C, V1, IDHA}
to FA and receive the message {B, IDFA,W1} from FA. However, the attacker still cannot
compute the correct session key SK = h(aB) since he/she cannot derive the secret information
a form A = aP based on the security of CDL problem. Thus, the proposed scheme can prevent
the replay attack.
Proposition 4. The proposed scheme meets the security requirement for perfect forward
secrecy.
Proof. Perfect forward secrecy means that even if an attacker compromises all the passwords
of the entities of the system, he/her still cannot compromise the session key. In the proposed
scheme, the session key SK = h(abP ) is generated by two one-time random numbers a and b in
each session. These two one-time random numbers are only held by theMU and FA respectively,
and cannot be retrieved from A = aP , B = bP , RAC = aC = cA and RBC = bC = cB
based on the security of CDL and CDH problem. Thus, even if an adversary obtains all the
passwords of the entities, previous session keys and all the transmitted messages, he/her still
cannot compromise other session key. Hence, the proposed scheme achieves perfect forward
secrecy.
Proposition 5. Our scheme can resist off-line password guessing attack with smart card
security breach.
Proof. In the proposed scheme, it is assume that if a smart card is stolen, physical protection
methods cannot prevent malicious attackers to get the stored secure elements. At the same time,
attacker can access to a big dictionary of words that likely includes user’s password and intercept
the communications between the user and server.
It is assumed that an attacker has obtained the information {Q,H,C, IDHA, xMU} from the
stolenMU ’s smart card and has intercepted a previous full transmitted messages {A,DIDMU , C,
V1, IDHA, B,W2, V2,W3, V3, B, IDFA,W1}. In the proposed scheme, MU ’s password only
makes two appearances as H = h(IDMU‖h(PWMU‖xMU )) and V1 = h((Q⊕h(PWMU‖xMU ))‖
aC‖IDHA). Obviously, the attacker cannot launch an off-line password guessing attack with-
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out knowing the IDMU and a. Since it has been demonstrated that our scheme can provide
user anonymity and a is MU ’s secret random number, the proposed scheme can resist off-line
password guessing attack with smart card security breach.
Proposition 6. The proposed scheme can withstand insider attack.
Proof. If an insider of the home agent HA has obtained a user MU ’s password PWMU ,
he/she can impersonate as MU to access any foreign agent. In the registration phase of the
proposed scheme, MU sends identity IDMU and h(PWMU‖xMU ) to HA. Thus, the insider
cannot derive PWMU without xMU . Besides, in the password change phase, MU can change
his/her default password PWMU without the assistance of his/her HA. Therefore the insider
has no chance to obtain MU ’s password, our scheme can withstand the insider attack.
Proposition 7. There is no verification table in the proposed scheme.
Proof. In the proposed scheme, it is obvious that the user, the foreign agent and the home
agent do not maintain any verification table.
Proposition 8. The proposed scheme can provide local password verification.
Proof. In the proposed scheme, smart card checks the validity of MU ’s identity IDMU and
password PWMU before logging into FA. Since the attacker cannot compute the correct H
without the knowledge of IDMU and PWMU to pass the verification equation H
∗ = H , thus
our scheme can avoid the unauthorized accessing by the local password verification.
§7 Performance comparison and functionality analysis
In this section, we compares the performance and functionality of our proposed scheme with
some previously schemes. It is well-known that most of the mobile devices have limited energy
resources and computing capability. Hence, one of the most important issues in wireless networks
is power consumption caused by communication and computation. In fact, the communication
cost in the GLOMONET is higher than computation cost in terms of power consumption. In
table 3, we list the numbers of the message exchanges in the login, authentication and session
key establish phases of our scheme and some related previous schemes. And the bit-length of
communication of the mobile client in these phases is also shown since the foreign agent and
home agent are regarded as powerful devices. Table 4 shows the computational cost of our
proposed scheme and some other related protocols. Here we mainly focus on the computational
cost of the login, authentication and session key establish phases because these phases are the
principal part of an authentication scheme. In general, our proposed scheme spends relatively
few communication and computational cost. It is suitable for the low-power and resource-limited
mobile devices.
Table 5 lists the functionality comparisons among our proposed scheme and other related
schemes. It is obviously that our scheme has many excellent features and is more secure than
other related schemes.
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Table 3: Communication cost comparison of our scheme and other schemes.
Our scheme He et al. [2] Li et al. [7] Mun et al. [8]
Communication (bits) 3808 2240 8224 4192
Communication (rounds) 4 4 4 5
The bit-length of different parameter: xP : 1024, gx modp: 1024, identity IDx: 160, time: 128,
random number: 128, hash function h(x): 160, encryption/decryption: 1024.
Table 4: Computational cost comparison of our scheme and other schemes.
Add Hash Mod Mul Esym Dsym Easym Dasym Gsign V sign
MU 2 6 N/A 1+2Pre N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Our scheme FA N/A 1 N/A 2+Pre 1 1 N/A N/A 1 1
HA 1 4 N/A 2 1 1 N/A N/A 1 1
MU 5 10 N/A N/A 1 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A
He et al. [2] FA N/A 2 N/A N/A 1 N/A N/A 1 1 1
HA 2 3 N/A N/A N/A 2 1 N/A 1 1
MU 4 2 1+3Pre N/A 3 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A
Li-Lee [7] FA N/A 1 3+2Pre N/A 2 2 N/A N/A 1 1
HA 2 3 3+Pre N/A 1 3 N/A N/A 1 1
MU 2 4 N/A 1+Pre 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Mun et al. [8] FA 2 3 N/A 1+Pre 1 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
HA 3 3 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A
Note: Pre: pre-computed operation, Add: XOR operation, Hash: hash operation, Mod: modular exponenti-
ation, Mul: point scalar multiplication, Esym: Symmetric encryption EK [·], Dsym: Symmetric decryption
DK [·], Easym: Asymmetric encryption EK{·}, Dasym: Asymmetric decryption DK{·}, Gsign: Signature
generation EK{h(·)}, V sign: Signature verification DK{h(·)}.
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Table 5: Functionality comparison between the related schemes and our scheme.
Our Wu Chang He He Mun Li
scheme et al. et al. et al. et al. et al. et al.
[6] [5] [2] [9] [8] [7]
User’s anonymity Yes No No No No No Yes
Proper mutual authentication Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes
Resist MU impersonation attack Yes No Yes Yes No No Yes
Resist FA impersonation attack Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Resist HA impersonation attack Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Resist replay attack Yes No Yes Yes No No No
Perfect forward secrecy Yes No No No No Yes Yes
Resist off-line password guessing attack Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Resist insider attack Yes No No Yes No No Yes
No verification table Yes Yes No Yes No Yes Yes
Local password verification Yes No No Yes Yes No No
Correct password change Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Provid the authentication scheme when
user is located in his/her home network Yes No No Yes No No No
§8 Conclusion
In this paper, we show that the recently proposed Mun et al.’s authentication scheme for roaming
service cannot provide user friendliness, user’s anonymity, proper mutual authentication and
local verification and also vulnerable to several attacks. In order to withstand security flaws in
Mun et al.’s scheme, we propose a novel anonymous authentication scheme for roaming service in
global mobility networks. Security and performance analyses show the proposed scheme is more
suitable for the low-power and resource-limited mobile devices, and is secure against various
attacks and has many excellent features.
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